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Back to the future: Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 
Sometimes the changing perceptions of classic books and their authors tell a larger, often more 
complex, story. So it is with Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). TMS was Smith’s 
first and last book. Having gone through five editions—the last one being prepared almost from the 
deathbed—, its various editions sandwiched his other classic book, The Wealth of Nations (WN) for 
which Smith became a household name. Today Smith is first and foremost identified as one of the 
founding fathers of political economy, a fact that is perhaps no better expressed than by the Bank of 
England’s twenty pound note, showing the man and paying reference to WN. Such was the 
perception of Smith—until the onslaught of the current economic crisis. 
As the current interest and wave of recent reception and scholarship makes clear, Adam Smith is 
making an unexpected comeback. What is new is that over the last ten years, and pretty much 
overlapping with the current economic crisis, the talk is now less about Smith the political economist 
and author of WN, or about political economy or the benefits of open markets and commercial 
activities, than about Adam Smith the moral philosopher and his ground breaking TMS. It seems 
that scholars have begun to discover and excavate the ‘real’ Adam Smith, the moral philosopher who 
wrote about sociability, virtuous behaviour and sympathy and who reasoned that these features must 
not necessarily be seen in contradiction to, but rather helped to embed market relations, commercial 
activities and pursuit of self-interest for the purpose of the common wealth. 
Perhaps there never really was an Adam Smith Rätsel—an Adam Smith conundrum, that is, the 
assumed contradiction between the author of TMS and the author of WN—but rather a case of 
prolepsis, a re-projection onto Smith in the sense that he was assumed to have said things he could 
 
Hess, Passions 
Serendipities 1. 2016 (2): 178–187 | DOI 179 
not possibly have said. The story of such a conundrum deserves its own intellectual history since it 
is such an obvious misrepresentation of the man and his work, revealing perhaps more about the 
changing times and his critics than about Smith himself.  
What I would like to do in this short paper is to outline briefly how the story of Smith’s 
(mis)representation is very much the story of its time expressed in thought, or to paraphrase Hegel, 
“ihre Zeit in Gedanken gefasst”. I will do so by focusing primarily on Smith and how he saw the 
passions and the interests and doux commerce coming together. In this context I will also briefly 
refer to a more political reading of this relationship in Tocqueville, mainly because it adds another 
transcontinental dimension to the debate. I will close with some speculation as to why Smith could 
have been misrepresented, mainly by looking briefly at those who seem to have been left behind in 
the development and debate and who, in anticipation of being forced to talk about their own 
backwardness, evaded the argument by trying to blame both the message and the messenger—a kind 
of hermeneutical incorporation in which the harbinger of the news gets obliterated (an unsuccessful 
variation of R. K. Merton’s obliteration through incorporation so to speak). 
Sattelzeit 
The German historian Reinhart Koselleck has coined the term Sattelzeit to signify a transitional 
period comprising roughly one hundred years between 1750 and1850, a time comprising not only 
the late Enlightenment and the French Revolution and its wider political and social and cultural 
repercussions but also the take-off of the industrial revolution including the rise of commercial and 
market activities and networks. This was a crucial ‘axial’ time in which political concepts and notions 
were redefined or underwent radical revisions, or where new concepts emerged in tandem with, or 
as a reaction to, new realities and experiences. Particularly noticeable was that the new omnipresence 
of commerce, trade and industry posed a problem for traditional political language as it had been 
transmitted from classic times (and despite having been already re-conceptualized and enriched in 
the early modern period, especially in the Renaissance and the Reformation). The questions that this 
new axial age posed were: How could one conceive of radically altered circumstances? Was it possible 
to maintain the validity of classic virtues when everything else was changing? How did the new 
activities of commerce and trade relate to the passions and how could one make sure that the new 
virtues prevailed against the vices? And, last but not least, how did latecomers to the development 
and jealousy (of trade, of commerce, of industry) fit into the debate? 
Thus the Sattelzeit became the great semantic tombola in which every concept received either a new 
meaning, was enriched by extension or was, as happened in some cases, overtaken and replaced by 
another concept. The tension between older notions and the attempt to conceptualize the new 
manifested itself in the writings in a number of prominent scholars. What is even more remarkable 
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was that these attempts at reconceptualization or semantical change were not limited to one country 
or nation. Rather, what remains fascinating about this axial time period is the international character 
of the intellectual network of this newly constituted republic of letters in which the most productive 
thinkers not only looked at their local or national circumstances but also for new evidence or new 
experiences outside their own country: no Hume and Smith without Montesquieu or Rousseau, no 
Kant and Hegel without Hume and Smith, and, to extend the argument beyond Europe, no American 
Federalists and no Tocqueville without Montesquieu, Hume or Smith.  
The Passions and the Interests 
Hume had been the first philosopher to alert his readers to the extent to which commerce, trade and 
industry had become modern features and needed to be addressed in their own right. As he rightly 
observed, there were no reflections about commerce or industry in the political tracts of Machiavelli 
or other republican thinkers; and apart from thoughts on property, there was also not much to be 
found in later contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke. Hume’s essays rightly deserve the praise 
of having put commerce and trade and the way they relate to politics on the intellectual agenda. 
Hume was also right in dismissing earlier critics like Mandeville, who had famously argued in his 
Fable of the Bees that pursuing one’s interests had become the new virtue and that therefore political 
economy was really all about hypocrisy. Against such notions Hume tried to provide a more balanced 
view, partly drawing on Montesquieu’s ideal-type distinction in The Spirit of the Laws, i.e. 
monarchies, republics and despotism and their respective features honour (monarchies), virtue 
(republics) and fear (despotism). 
Hume did see some merit in Montesquieu’s praise of England, despite some of the Frenchman’s 
exaggerations. Both were of the view that a constitutional monarchy like England did not fit any ideal 
type and that its governance actually combined republican and democratic features with that of a 
monarchy. ‘Mixed government’ was a hybrid form that was based on the impersonal rule of law, that 
guaranteed personal liberty and free opinion, tolerated a diversity of interests and that seemed in 
terms of trade and commercial activities more supportive when compared with the praxis of other 
nations. However, in the last instance it was not just institutions and mixed government that held all 
together but a collective ‘psychological’ predisposition which Montesquieu called the ‘spirit of the 
laws’. It was this spirit that explained the functioning of the English political and social system. It 
kept the passions in check and allowed for a myriad of different interests to be heard. Hume managed 
to build on Montesquieu’s argument and to take it a step further. Hindsight and having been in a 
position to study the developments in trade and commercial activities since Montesquieu helped. 
Hume also benefitted from other debates such as those in pre-revolutionary France. And last but not 
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least he could study the developments of Scotland first hand, particularly the changes that had 
occurred after the Act of Union with England. 
Smith took over the baton from Hume—and by that I do not just refer to ‘economic’ matters. 
Benefitting greatly from teachers like Hume and Hutchinson and from the networks and institutions 
of higher learning in the ‘capital of the mind’ that Edinburgh (and earlier Glasgow) had become 
Smith produced his own great first work. TMS was a work of synthesis, perhaps the first attempt 
systematically to study sociability and to think about what held modern society together and what 
made it function successfully. As Albert O. Hirschman rightly pointed out, as a moral philosopher 
Smith was first and foremost concerned with what would replace traditional rule, inherited status 
and the values and norms associated with it. Could classic virtues still influence or even be able to 
control the passions? And what would happen to the passions in a new commercial system marked 
by different classes and interests? Any theory that still assumed that the world had not changed and 
that feudalism, agriculture and traditional values were still the most important features was clearly 
insufficient.  
Smith pursued, almost with Durkheimian passion, the question of what kept a modernizing society 
together and what prevented it from falling or drifting apart. TMS is the attempt to spell out what we 
can realistically expect from each other and how we can build trusting and reciprocal relationships—
and accumulated common wealth. Smith was looking for the possibilities of a new form of sociability, 
one that was able not only to bind the passions but also to steer them into the right direction, so that 
both the individuals and society as a whole would benefit. Smith’s TMS is a study of a moral 
psychology that does not treat individuals as if they were islands or monads who do not communicate 
with each other. TMS is a phenomenological description of how our moral actions are grounded in 
sociability and guided by sentiments like empathy and sympathy (compassion would be another 
word for these capabilities).  
Smith argues that most of what constitutes moral action is due to listening to an inner voice, a kind 
of internalized normative reasoning that we have acquired while growing up—he calls it the 
‘impartial spectator’—a capacity to reflect through an ‘imagined other’ about what is just or unjust, 
fair and unfair, appropriate action or not. The point is that its ultimate reason is not just pursuing 
one’s own selfish interests but to act in a way that is good for both, ego and alter. As one attentive 
reader has pointed out, for Smith ‘moral’ becomes almost synonymous with ‘social’; in other words, 
for him there is no social life and no social action that does not have a base in some form of sympathy 
or involve some form of moral judgement. 
Of course Smith also knew that humans can sometimes behave selfishly or in egocentric and totally 
self-interested fashion. But in the long run he trusted that any person would naturally strive for what 
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he called ‘emulation’, the kind of soft competitiveness that is the outcome of a learning process in 
which private interest is increasingly replaced by public interest and a concern for the common good. 
For that to happen, however, human and anthropological features and sentiments like that of 
sympathy, resulting in turn in mutual expectations and concern for others, must, in order to grow, 
be safeguarded and protected by social institutions such as the family, the school or university, the 
law or the state. To put it differently, civil society had to draw on resources that economic reasoning 
and action alone were not able to deliver. 
For some interpreters Smith’s WN seems to have argued the exact opposite. Sympathy, empathy, 
indeed any form of compassion should be substituted by the pursuit of self-interest. In other words, 
individual profit seeking should become the driver if not the all-determining prime activity. Against 
such one-sided reading any attentive reader of both TMS and WN will detect that Smith argues 
actually none of that—at least not on purpose. What WN intended was, first, to take a closer look at 
features like commerce, trade, industry which had come to play a more prominent role in modern 
society. Second, WN was written with the intention to think how these new features in our lives and 
the social action related to them could be used more beneficially so that the entire society—in Smith’s 
times this meant in the first instance ‘the nation’—could benefit from the new system called political 
economy.  
Albert O. Hirschman famously referred to such thinking as ‘political arguments in favour of 
capitalism before its triumph’. If we look at the beginnings this way capitalism was not invented as a 
nasty trick to fool everybody, but markets and commerce existed for the purpose of helping the 
individual to free him- or herself from dependency or recurrent cycles of poverty and crises and from 
the shackles of traditional, feudal, agricultural society. It was meant to be an improvement, and at 
that a much more stable undertaking than what had been known until then. In contrast to Mandeville 
or those who defended unreconstructed republican values and virtues as if nothing had changed 
Smith thought of how the new features and activities of commercial society could actually contribute 
to the greater public good. He did not favour nor did he foresee the enrichment of the few in a the-
winner-takes-it-all society or the enslavement of the many in a new industrial capitalist system. 
Smith always strove for balance, not for disturbance, or even worse, disintegration. 
Indeed one searches in vain in Smith’s WN to find the word ‘interest’ or ‘private interest’ pejoratively 
used and beyond the mere technical sense of the word. The same is true for TMS. What one finds 
though is the idea that being involved in commerce, trade and industry would be beneficial to both 
the private and the public interest. More wealth was created than was the case in traditional societies, 
which depended overwhelmingly on agricultural production and a static system of property and 
ownership of the few—an unjust system by any standards. Smith’s idea was that passions could and 
should be channeled through interest as long as they were properly understood so that in the end 
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both ego and alter, and by extension society as a whole, would benefit from the new system. That for 
Smith was the deeper meaning of being engaged in doux commerce as the French called it, of 
importance here being the adjective ‘gentle’. To think of the commercial agent solely in terms of a 
profit-seeking human yet with an animal-like instinct and lacking the basic quality of empathy, 
sympathy or compassion, was not a notion one finds defended or encouraged by Smith. To read into 
Smith a laissez faire argument or a defense of unregulated markets or a hands-off state position is 
a-historical and false. In contrast, the political economical system described in WN was to be 
embedded in moral action (as described in TMS); i.e. being involved in commerce and trade did not 
mean to stand outside the moral realm or to act without morals. One has to read Smith in the 
intellectual history of his time to understand the relationship between the TMS and WN, not re-
project and think of Smith a free marketer or even worse, a neo-liberal before his time.  
Echoes of Smith in Tocqueville 
Smith took an interest in American affairs and more than once declared that it might be a good idea 
for Britain to let the colonies establish their own commerce, markets and taxation system—from 
which he hoped Britain would profit more than it did with North America under colonial rule. As we 
know, some prominent thinkers among the American Federalists had taken Scottish Enlightenment 
ideas to heart and intended to put them into practice. Yet, the name of Adam Smith and that of David 
Hume or the title of any of their treatises or books never show up in any of the drafts nor were they 
mentioned in the minutes of the deliberations in Philadelphia. In the Federalist Papers Hume is only 
mentioned once and then only on the penultimate page. Such omission was probably related to other 
issues; after all, Hume had made no case in favour of any form of political theology while in Smith’s 
TMS religion is mentioned but is, unlike Locke, not essential to the central argument about 
sociability and sympathy. Both Hume and Smith would have had no truck with the Deism of some 
of the more prominent American Founding Fathers and the same applied vice versa.  
On the other side Hume’s History of England and his Essays were much read texts. Adams refers to 
them repeatedly. But then again, Smith’s name comes up only very late in the correspondence 
between Adams and Jefferson and then only once in the context of Adam’s reading of Senator Tracy’s 
popular introduction to political economy. However, not a few observers have detected an elective 
affinity between the arguments made by Hume and Smith and Madison, particularly in Federalist 
No 10. The passages about the impossibility of a pure democracy resemble very much Hume’s 
arguments in his essays while the reflections about controlling passions and their effects in larger 
republics in which interests are pitched against interests sounded very much like a combination of 
Smith’s TMS and WN.  
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More than four decades separate Tocqueville, the author of Democracy in America, from the 
Philadelphia Convention and The Federalist Papers. While Tocqueville cannot claim to have coined 
the term ‘interest properly understood’ is was Tocqueville who had filled it with life and who had 
given a detailed description on how sociability worked in America. Again what applies to Smith also 
applies to Tocqueville: while he was interested in political economy he was interested in what held 
the new society together and what made it work, something that cannot be reduced to political 
economy. Like Smith, Tocqueville saw that commerce and industry were activities that were of prime 
importance not just to Europeans but particularly to those who came to settle in America. For him, 
and that had been the whole purpose of his journey, their function appeared here to be more visible 
and, due to the lack of feudal shackles and an ancien régime, in purer form. The question was then 
how such interests in commercial activities related to habits and mores and how the new commercial 
activities could be reconciled with other aspects of the new democratic system.  
Tocqueville had been an avid reader of the Federalist Papers; however, through reading Jean 
Baptiste Say’s political economy, and later Nassau Senior’s popular account of the same subject, he 
began to reflect on how the Americans managed to combine self-interest with the common good to 
form mores or what he called the ‘habits of the heart’. What is important to bear in mind here is that 
Tocqueville favoured a holistic view; he was interested in the political, social and cultural practices 
and dimensions rather than just economic activity or interest per se. For him, whoever discovered 
how ‘interest properly understood’ worked held the key to an understanding of modern man and 
society. 
So how did it work? Tocqueville points out that for Americans there was no way that individual 
pursuit and individual motivation were ever to be abolished; they could only be controlled and be 
kept in check, in the first instance by being bound up with the pursuit of the common good. The trick 
lay in convincing the other person that it was in each other’s interest to be good. Such a conviction, 
once in motion, then becomes something like a social perpetuum mobile, a self-prolonging praxis 
which helps to bring forward a common sense of purpose, something that resembles very much what 
Smith had in mind when he talked about sociability (and was very different from Kant’s ‘unsocial 
sociability’). According to Tocqueville Americans did this successfully by taking small steps and by 
combining daily engagement with the notion of usefulness instead of favouring grand gestures, 
sacrifices or grand theories. Size mattered as well. For Tocqueville the small townships of New 
England in particular became local laboratories for democracy and contributed to maintaining the 
larger democratic entity that is the U.S. They did so by relying and having trust in a mixed system of 
governance which in turn consisted of direct democracy elements and involvement on the local level, 
and a system of staggered or layered representation organized along the subsidiarity principle (local 
community, county, state, federal government).  
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A sense of political equality and seeing personally the results of one’s engagement seemed to work, 
despite being conceived by Tocqueville as being circular and functioning rather like a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. To be sure such a system also had its negative sides, something of which Tocqueville was 
equally aware: because ‘enlightened egoism’ was almost never criticised in the American system it 
helped to create an unreflected consensus in which any opposition was immediately regarded as 
threatening to the majority consensus and was therefore in danger of becoming quashed or being 
labelled as dissent. As Tocqueville warned, democracy’s habits of the heart and ‘interest properly 
understood’ can have their negative counterpart in the tyranny of the majority. But that is perhaps 
another story altogether and would take us far beyond Hume’s and Smith’s understandings of the 
passions or the original notions of doux commerce. 
Tocqueville wrote about commerce, trade and industry towards the end of Koselleck’s Sattelzeit. 
Taking 1850 as the historical cut-off point neither at the time of the founding of the American 
republic nor at the time of Tocqueville’s visit almost five decades later does America qualify as a 
capitalist country (if we mean by capitalist not just a system which is based in the division of labour, 
trade and commerce, but a system that is mainly based on industry and in which profit is generated 
from surplus production for the sake of making a profit). That development only took place from the 
middle of the 19th century onwards in the decade leading up to the Civil War, with the Civil War 
being the great catalyst that would turn the U.S. into a capitalist country. Any suggestion that 
Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, the Federalists or Tocqueville were simply early proselytizers for, or 
legitimists of a capitalist system that would manifest itself only decades later, or that the mentioned 
were somehow able to predict the future and act accordingly, is a serious case of prolepsis and 
mistaken. 
Back to Europe: The Smith conundrum in perspective 
The last point brings us to the final step of my argument. We have almost gone full circle but with 
one unanswered question remaining: how indeed was such a misreading of Smith and others 
possible, or, in other words how could Smith turn into a capitalist apologist? The answer lies, I 
suspect, mainly in the history of Continental Europe and particularly one country—Germany. 
Karl Marx was not the only one to spot that for most of the early 19th century and perhaps as late as 
1848 Germany was far behind its main competitors France and Britain—politically, socially and 
economically. In one of his earlier writings, the Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he 
complained bitterly that while the French had had their political revolution and the British their 
industrial revolution Germany remained a backward country that only had one aspect that worked 
in its favour: the capacity for philosophy and critique. From later works, especially from the 
Grundrisse and Das Kapital, we can detect that Marx was actually quite fond of Smith. He liked 
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Smith’s rigor and empiricism even though his critique of political economy contained a critical 
dialectical twist against Smith: Marx used largely the language of political economy while criticizing, 
socializing and even transcending it at the same time (the latter in the sense of Hegel’s aufheben or 
Aufhebung). 
It was less the left-wing Hegelians like Marx than the more conservative-leaning hawkish Hegelians 
in the Prussian bureaucracy who read Smith as an advocate, or even worse, as an apologist for British 
aspirations. While an earlier and more progressive thinking Prussian circle of reform-oriented minds 
(Kant, Hegel, the two Humboldt brothers, von Stein and Hardenberg would qualify, Marx was never 
part of it although he stemmed from a rheinisch Prussian environment) still read Smith mainly as 
an enlightenment philosopher who had a keen interest in explaining sociability as emerging in 
tandem with the fast developing commercial society, later leading Prussian statesmen, secretaries, 
civil servants including not a few state sponsored academics like List (and later the so-called 
Katheder socialists like Schmoller), became alarmed about how uncontrollable the new political 
economy and the sociability it favoured would become. Particularly in the period after the War of 
Liberation against the French, roughly until the 1848 revolution and the fatal and for all purposes 
too-soon abandoned parliamentary convention in Frankfurt, a more conservative Prussian state and 
bureaucracy favoured a more state-centred approach that made sure that when it came to liberty and 
order, order would come first and economic, social and cultural liberty second. Forgotten was 
Smith’s TMS and in came a narrow reading of WN. Smith became ‘the other’, not only in terms of 
sociability and morals but also in terms of an economistic reading of WN.  
The later 19th century and the twentieth century changed all perceptions of Smith beyond 
recognition. TMS became soon forgotten, not just in Germany (having said that it made a short and 
surprise return in the height of the Weimar Republic only to disappear again soon after), relegated 
as it were somewhere to post-Humean but still pre-Kantian philosophic status. In turn WN was on 
the up, now somehow freed from the moral constraints of TMS. It enjoyed all the success I have 
referred to in the beginning until the algebraization of economics took over from Marshall onwards. 
Such is the history of modern capitalism, it cannot even get its theoretical origins right. 
Timeline 
1707: Act of Union between Scotland and England. 
1729–1731: Montesquieu visits England. 
1742: Bernard Mandeville: Fable of the Bees. 
1748: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Engl. translation 1750). 
1755: Death of Montesquieu. Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. 
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1759: Adam Smith: first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
1754–62: Multiple volumes of David Hume’s History of Great Britain appear in instalments (all 
volumes are finally published in 1762 as History of England). 
1776: Declaration of American Independence; death of David Hume; publication of Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations; first German translation of WN. 
1777: First complete (posthumous) edition of David Hume’s Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary. 
Various earlier editions of the Essays were published between 1741 and 1772. 
1784: Immanuel Kant: “Idea for a Universal History” (Kant declares A. Smith to be one of his 
favourite authors; Kant discusses ‘unsocial sociability’ in his essay). 
1787: Philadelphia Convention. 
1788: J. Madison, A. Hamilton, J. Jay: The Federalist Papers. 
1789: Beginning of the French Revolution. 
1790: Death of Adam Smith; publication of revised 6th edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
1791/95: First German translation of Smith’s TMS. 
1800: J. G. Fichte: The Closed Commercial State. 
1803: Jean-Baptiste Say: A Treatise on Political Economy. 
1803–06: G. F. W. Hegel: Jena lectures (with textual evidence that Hegel had read Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations). 
1806–13/14: Napoleonic control over Prussia. 
1813/14: Prussian War of Liberation. 
1814/15: Vienna Congress; recovery of Prussia’s lost territories. 
1831/32: Trip of Tocqueville and Beaumont to America. 
1835/40: Publication of Tocqueville’s first and second part of Democracy in America. 
1842: Friedrich List: The National System of Political Economy. 
1843: Karl Marx: “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” (in Deutsch–Französische Jahrbücher). 
1848/49: Revolutions in Europe; March Revolution in Germany; National Convention in Frankfurt 
(kleindeutsche option pursued by Prussia after Austria declares itself Empire). 
 
